Abstract: This POLICY PAPER examines whether there is a relationship between regulated rates for "unbundled local loops" and deployment of broadband technology by incumbents and entrants.
I. Introduction
Ever since the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the incumbent Bell monopolies have argued that the 1996 Act's wholesale network access policies (like unbundling) dampen or decrease their incentive to deploy † Chief Economist, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies. The views expressed in this paper are the authors' alone and do not represent the views of the Phoenix Center, its Adjunct Fellows, or any of its individual Editorial Advisory Board members. ‡ President, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies.
Administration recently decided not to defend and support the Federal Communications Commission's local telephone network unbundling policies before the Supreme Court, 5 and the FCC has just released "interim" unbundling rules that increase significantly the price for local loop connections that facilitiesbased entrants depend upon to provide U.S. small and mid-sized businesses with new, innovative and inexpensive services. 6 As a result, as the incumbents raise their wholesale rates above, and lower their commercial rates below, cost, 7
August 20, 2004) (hereinafter "Interim Rules") (UNE-P is a "synthetic form of competition that would never have proved sustainable, or have provided long-lasting consumer benefits."); Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View from the Doorstep of FCC Change, 54 FED. COM. L.J. 199, 206-7 (2002) ("Excessive sharing of facilities destroys the investment incentives of both incumbents and new entrants alike: rational incumbents avoid risking capital on new facilities if rivals can get a free ride, and rational entrants will refrain from deploying their own facilities if they have unrestricted access to incumbents' networks at cost-based rates. This stifling of investment incentives is all the more problematic where supposedly "cost-based" rates are, as in some cases, based on a model that makes unrealistic economic assumptions and accordingly turn out to be below actual cost. In striving to stimulate some form of local telephone competition, by creating expansive resale and unbundling opportunities, we have adopted rules that have failed to engender, and may have actually hampered, facilities-based competition-which is the most viable strategy in the long term and the one most likely to benefit consumers."). Curiously, it is unclear why public policy should focus so exclusively on the investment incentives of four firms rather than on generic sector investment. In so doing, these policies reek of centralized industrial planning and a deliberate choice in picking winners and losers. (Reporting that while on the one hand SBC is currently asking Michigan regulators to raise wholesale rates from $14/month to $28/month on the ground that current rates below $28 are purportedly confiscatory and below costs; yet on the other hand, quotes SBC Chief Operating Officer Randall Stephenson as stating that even though selling UNE-P at $14 is below cost, it is profitable for SBC to offer retail service in Michigan at a "promotional" rate of $7.95 because when the promotion expires in six months, the price would jump to $17.95. ("If I keep this customer [with promotions], I'm going to get $28 in the future and that's a lot better than $14."). Significantly, however, $17.96 is still 36% below the $28 to which SBC is asking Michigan regulators to boost its wholesale rate. [Number 19 Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org firms as large as AT&T and as small as Hoosier Telecom are being squeezed from the "mass market" for local telephone services. 8
According to FCC Chairman Michael Powell, however, we need not worry about the demise of the 1996 Act's wholesale access provisions, because in one year "no one significant will be competing using unbundled network elements" 9 ; instead, "there is going to be more competition, it's going to be better than what we had before, and I'll even go so far as to say: this isn't a prediction, it's a promise." 10 The purpose of this POLICY PAPER, therefore, is to test Mr. Powell's fundamental assumption that regulated rates for wholesale network access policies (like unbundling) dampen or decrease the incentive to deploy broadband technology.
The variability in rates for unbundled loops should help test which policy will result in the broadest availability of broadband services -i.e., a policy that promotes competition and choice (e.g., low loop rates) or a policy that promotes the protection of incumbent investment (e.g., high loop rates). Generally, if the argument that unbundling deters investment is correct, then we would expect to see more broadband deployment in states with higher unbundled loop prices, ceteris paribus.
The econometric analysis in this POLICY PAPER shows the opposite, however: unbundled loop prices based on Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") actually lead to increased availability of broadband services and increased availability of competitive broadband services defined as area with at least four broadband providers. As a result, current policies which are openly Powell urging him to recognize and halt the adverse consequences of his policies. They noted that because most CLECs "operate on thin margins in highly price sensitive markets … they simply [can] not absorb such dramatic cost increases or pass them along to customers in the form of increased rates". As such, the expected radical "increase in the price of the embedded base of high capacity loops and transport likely would cause some (competitors) to violate loan covenants." Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org hostile to the market-opening provisions of the 1996 Act will actually hinder President Bush's self-professed goal of "universal, affordable access for broadband technology by 2007." 11 Instead, these new policies will, in fact, lead to greater economic concentration and incumbent market power in the industry as firms are forced to exit the market. 12
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II. Empirical Model
The empirical analysis contained in this POLICY PAPER addresses the relationship between the price of unbundled loops and broadband availability. Local loops are the wires that connect each and every home, office, business, or building to the incumbent local telephone company's central switching offices. Unbundling these loops requires the incumbent to lease those wires at a price approximating forward-looking economic costs to new entrants, so that new entrants need not deploy their own loops in order to offer service in a region. These loops are generally made up of twisted copper wires and, increasingly, fiber optic cable. While there has been extensive debate before the FCC and state commissions as to whether a policy that forces incumbents to lease these loops (particularly fiber loops) would provide a disincentive for incumbents to deploy more fiber and broadband technology, until the end of 2003, federal rules clearly required that incumbents lease all of their loops -fiber optic loops included -to new entrants at rates set by the state regulatory commission. 13 As such, this .html). Curiously, however, President Bush appear to prefer to take a sequential approach to the problem -that is: "We ought to have a universal, affordable access for broadband technology by the year 2007, and then we ought to make sure as soon as possible thereafter, consumers have got plenty of choices when it comes to purchasing the broadband carrier." Taking this thought to its logical conclusion, it would appear that one fundamental assumption underlies the President's broadband policy: a view that promoting broadband competition or "choice" is incompatible with promoting broadband deployment, at least in the near term.
12
See supra nn. 7-8. Using publicly-available data collected and distributed by the FCC, this POLICY PAPER creates two measures of broadband availability. The first variable reflects only availability of a single broadband provider and is defined as the percentage of zip codes in a state that have at least one provider of broadband services. The FCC publishes this zip code data annually. This variable (A U ) reflects only the universality of access. The second variable is defined as the percentage of zip codes in a state that have at least four providers of broadband services. This variable (A C ) measures competitive access to broadband services. 15 With these two measures of availability we can evaluate the influence of unbundling on both the general availability of broadband service as well as whether or not the service is provided competitively.
Incremental Cost (TELRIC)" for section 251 UNEs and "just and reasonable" rates pursuant to sections 201 and 202 of the Communications Act of 1934 for section 271 UNEs. 14 One of the major arguments supporting the movement to remove these access and pricing decisions from state commissions is that there are allegedly high differences in the prices for that access. This argument does not withstand scrutiny, however, because it has been statistically proven that that differences in UNE-P prices both across States and within States are due to genuine cost differences and differences in TELRIC and are not because of regulatory failure by the GAME THEORY 2 (1973) . This model is presented more intuitively in Louis Phillips [sic], COMPETITION POLICY: A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE Ch. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). An empirical study which finds that additional market entry has little effect on market conduct once a market has between three and five firms is provided by Timothy F. Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets, 99 J. OF POL. ECON. 997-1009 ECON. 997- (1991 . These limits roughly comport with the limit in the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines between moderately-and highly-concentrated markets. DOJ/FTC Guidelines § 1.51.") Of course, broadband availability will be affected by more than just unbundling policy. A number of factors are expected to affect the ubiquity and competitiveness of broadband access including per-capita income, population density, time, and region specific factors. Measures for these factors include percapita state income (INC), the percent of rural population (RURAL), the number of large cities (>250,000 in population) in a state (BIGCITY), and dummy variables for time (the data is semester data) and Bell Company region (DVZ, DBLS, DSBC, DAMER; DQWEST is excluded to avoid the dummy trap). 16 Primarily, the policy inquiry should be on whether or not the prices of unbundled loops bear some relation to broadband availability. 17 This POLICY PAPER tests this proposition because many policymakers argue that the requirements that incumbents lease these loops to competitors at rates established by the state commission retard or stunt the deployment of new broadband services. 18 At the same time, having unbundled loops can promote deployment of broadband technology by new entrants, particularly those that utilize these loops to provide digital subscriber line ("DSL") broadband services, so are a fundamental component of broadband availability and competition. Thus, the question is an empirical one, and empirical questions cannot be resolved by non-empirical arguments. By examining the variability in rates for unbundled loops, it is possible to test which policy will result in the broadest availability of broadband services -i.e., a policy that promotes competition and choice (e.g., low loop rates) or a policy that promotes the protection of incumbent investment (e.g., high loop rates).
For purposes of analysis, price is measured as the statewide average unbundled loop price. In addition to the price of the unbundled loop (P L ), the See supra nn. 9-10. model includes a measure of the cost of unbundled loops (C L ). By including both of these variables in the empirical model, it is possible to estimate the unique contributions of loop price and loop cost on availability. In other words, the estimated effect of loop price on availability is determined holding cost constant, so any effect of price on availability and competitive choice is independent of the correlation between availability and costs.
Since the availability variables (A i ) are both defined as a percentage, estimation is conducted using the Minimum Logit Chi-Square ("MLC") method (Berkson 1953; Maddala 1983) . 19 The estimated regression is
where D are time and Bell Company specific dummy variables (three time and five Bell dummies) and i is either U or C (our universality and competitive availability indexes). The logarithmic functional form for the explanatory variables is selected based on Godfrey et al. (1988) . 20 The MLC method is estimated by weighted least squares. 21 Two versions of Equation (1) are estimated. The first employs A U as the dependent variable (the percent of zip codes with at least one broadband provider) while in the second regression the dependent variable is A C (the percent of zip codes with at least four broadband providers). In other respects, the models are identical.
There are three possible results from this regression: (a) that higher loop rates promote broadband availability (β 1 > 0); (b) that higher loop rates retard broadband availability (β 1 < 0); or (c) that loop rates have no (measurable) relationship to broadband availability (β 1 = 0). Notably, regulations to date have required loop prices to equal forwardlooking costs. By including as a regressor an estimate of forward-looking cost that is void of state-specific regulatory and political idiosyncrasies, the empirical model estimates the effect of price on broadband availability independent of the cost of component of the price. Given that both price and cost are included as regressors, it is also possible to interpret the effect of price as the aggressiveness with which state commissions have established cost-based rates. As the FCC and long-established case law recognize, forward-looking cost must be estimated so that the end rate falls within a "zone of reasonableness" (i.e., the rate can neither be confiscatory nor excessive). 22 Some state commissions may draw from the lower end of the zone of reasonableness while others the higher end. The particular specification used by the model herein allows us to measure the impact of these pricing decisions by the state commission.
A. Specification Issues
To provide confidence in this chosen specification, the analysis subjects the empirical model to the specification test RESET. RESET is capable of detecting a variety of specification errors including omitted variables and incorrect function form. 23 The null hypothesis of RESET is "no specification error," so specification error is indicated only if the null is rejected. The RESET F-Statistic is well below the critical value for both regression models providing evidence that specification error is not a problem. RESET is also recommended by Gilchrest et al. (1988) in selecting a particular functional form, and the analysis also employs RESET in this way to finalize the specification. White's test for heteroscedasticity Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486 , 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1984 ) (holding that the concept of "just and reasonable" must clearly be more than a "mere vessel into which meaning must be poured"). Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org does indicate that the regression disturbances are not homoscedastic (despite the MLC estimation technique), so White's robust standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics. 24 The fact the prices should be "based on cost" may result in a relatively high correlation between loop price and loop cost variables. Analysis finds that that is the case -loop prices and costs have a simple linear correlation coefficient of 0.79 (ρ = 0.79). This collinearity does not bias the estimated coefficients in our model, although it does reduce the efficiency of our estimates (that is, it decreases the tstatistics). However, the effect of this collinearity will actually serve to dampen the importance of loop price as a determinant of availability, which would make it more likely that the variable of particular concern (i.e., loop price) would be closer to zero (making a finding of "no effect" more likely). Generally, if the coefficient of interest (β 1 ) is found to be statistically different from zero (the null is rejected), then the analysis concludes that there is insufficient collinearity to require model adjustment. 25 Interestingly, the fact that the analysis finds a relationship between broadband availability and loop rates even with this collinearity bolsters confidence in the results.
B. Summary of Results
The results of the estimation and descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 shows a number of interesting relationships between broadband availability and various factors, including rural population, time, and, of particular interest to this study, unbundled loop prices. The regressions explain large percentages of the variation in the availability (of both types) across states (the unweighted R-squares are 0.63 and 0.78, respectively). 26 Both broadband availability and competitiveness appear to be driven primarily by rural population, time, and unbundled loop prices. All of these variables are statistically significant determinants of the availability (at the 5% level or better) in both models. The results indicate that states with a higher proportion of rural population have less broadband availability, another 24 Id. at 382-3. 25 Id. at 344-5. We also note that the Variance Inflation Factors for both P L and C L are less than 10, a number which is generally taken to imply high multicollinearity. Id. at 338-9.
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org unsurprising result. The effect of rural population is large and highly statistically significant. As expected, the time-specific dummy variables indicate that broadband penetration has risen over time (all time dummies measure the difference from June 2002 data).
There are a few differences in the models. For example, there is a negative and marginally statistically significant relationship between the number of large cities in a state and universality, but the variable appears to have no effect on competitiveness. Income is relevant for competitiveness, but not for universality. The sign on the income variable is positive as would be expected and the regressor is statistically different from zero at better than the 10% level.
Turning to important relationship between loop price and our measures of broadband universality and competitiveness, the null hypothesis that the loop price has no effect on is rejected in both models. The coefficient on loop price (β 1 ) is consistently negative meaning that higher loop prices, holding costs and other factors constant, reduce both the universal and competitive availability of broadband services. For universality (Model 1), the implied elasticity is -0.10 indicating that a 10% decrease in the loop price (other things constant) will lead to a 1% increase in the number of zip codes with at least one broadband provider. At the sample mean, this increase would reduce the percentage of zip codes without broadband service by approximately 9%. At the sample mean, the elasticity of competitiveness with respect to loop price is -0.08. Table 2 summarizes the effects on broadband availability for each state resulting from a $1 increase in the loop rate. This simulation uses the estimated coefficients from the regression model to predict the reduction in availability of broadband services, based on average population in each state. If loop rates had been higher by $1 across all states, then the model predicts that about 3.6 million households would be unable to purchase broadband services today. It is interesting to note that if all states were to adopt the FCC's 12.95% cost of capital for unbundled elements set in the Virginia Arbitration Order (2003) 00-218 (August 29, 2003) at ¶64. The average cost of capital adopted in states for TELRIC models is about 10%. For every one-percentage point increase in the cost of capital, the loop rate increases by about 5%. [Number 19 Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies www.phoenix-center.org peculiar logic contained in the FCC's Order related to the cost of capital, then about seven million households would be without access to broadband services today.
III. Conclusion
This study adds to the mounting work showing that wholesale network access requirements (like unbundling) do not dampen broadband availability or investment incentives more generally. To the contrary, the analysis contained herein strongly shows that states that have established relatively lower rates for unbundled loop access have enjoyed more consumer choice and have seen more deployment of broadband technology within their borders.
Notwithstanding, the Administration and the FCC in particular recently have made significant efforts to reverse these policies and severely curtail competitive choice for residential and small business telephone consumers based upon flawed analytical foundations and little empirical support. Given the huge stakes involved, however, perhaps it is not too much to ask for policymakers to study and consider the evidence before they decide that a policy is or is not working. 
